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VERTICAL CONTROL
HERBERT HOVENKAMP*
Antitrust litigation often requires courts to consider challenges to vertical
“control.” How does a firm injure competition by limiting the behavior of
vertically related firms? Competitive injury includes harm to consumers, labor, or other suppliers from reduced output and higher margins.
Historically, antitrust considers this issue by attempting to identify a market
that is vertically related to the defendant, and then consider what portion of
it is “foreclosed” by the vertical practice. There are better mechanisms for
identifying competitive harm, including a more individualized look at how
the practice injures the best placed firms or bears directly on a firm’s ability
to reduce output and increase its price without losing so many sales that the
price increase is unprofitable. This Article discusses these mechanisms.
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INTRODUCTION

Although antitrust has developed unifying doctrines for addressing
horizontal mergers and agreements, analysis of vertical relationships has not
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reached a similar consensus.1 The problem of vertical control revolves
around one question: How does a firm injure competition by limiting the
behavior of vertically related entities? The affected entities are either
“upstream” firms and persons, including labor, that supply the firm in
question or else “downstream” firms or persons that purchase from it. After
an early period of antagonism toward vertical control, antitrust courts
subsequently shifted to a very benign position.2 Yet, despite the potential for
competitive injury, which includes harm to consumers, labor, or other
suppliers from reduced output and higher prices,3 antitrust law still lacks a
unified theory about how vertical relationships can harm competition.
When it comes to horizontal arrangements, antitrust policy has
developed largely agreed upon mechanisms for analyzing competitive
effects in agreements like cartels, joint ventures, and mergers of competitors.
Their competitive threats have been robustly theorized. Horizontal
agreements or mergers reduce the number of effective rivals in a market,
making collusive outcomes, including higher prices, more likely. In some
cases they may permit pairs of firms in product differentiated markets to raise
prices unilaterally4 or even create a monopoly.5 By contrast, a vertical merger
or contract does not automatically reduce the number of firms in any market
or give any participant a larger market share.
Vertical “control” in this context means something more than a simple
one-off transaction that leaves the parties free to engage in all other business.
Examples of vertical control include vertical mergers, in which one firm
acquires a vertically related firm,6 or vertical integration by contract, in
which the parties agree to longer term relationships that come with other
restrictions. These contractual relationships come in a large variety, which
has complicated legal analysis. Among the varieties are relatively long-term

1 On antitrust policy concerning vertical integration by dominant firms, see 3B PHILLIP E.
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES
AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶¶ 755–69 (4th ed. 2016); on vertical mergers, see id. ¶ 1000 (4th ed.
2016); on vertical contractual restraints by firms that are not necessarily dominant, see id. ¶¶ 1600,
1800 (4th ed. 2017–18). On the meandering course of antitrust analysis of vertical arrangements,
see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT,
1870–1970, at 220–42 (2015).
2 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1 (detailing the history of judicial posture towards instances of
vertical control).
3 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND
ITS PRACTICE § 2.3(c) (6th ed. 2020).
4 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 914 (4th ed. 2017)
(discussing how mergers may threaten unilateral anticompetitive effects in product differentiated
markets).
5 See id. ¶ 911; N. Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 322 (1904) (condemning merger
to monopoly by two east-west transcontinental railroads).
6 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 221; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 1000(c)
(4th ed. 2016).
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arrangements in which one firm agrees to deal exclusively in the other’s
products (exclusive dealing),7 both short-term and long-term arrangements
in which one firm agrees to take combinations of two or more products from
the other firm (tying and bundling),8 and arrangements in which a firm
promises that the terms it offers others will be less favorable, or at least no
more favorable, than the terms given to the contracting party (most-favorednation, or MFN, agreements).9 There are also variations or combinations of
these, including several that involve conditional discounts or rebates rather
than outright prohibitions.10
Many earlier antitrust decisions involving vertical control exhibited
deep suspicion of devices that a firm operating at one market level might
employ in order to control output or dealing at a second upstream or
downstream level.11 Some decisions feared monopolistic leveraging, or the
idea that a firm with a monopoly in one product could use a vertical
agreement such as tying to extract additional monopoly profits in a second
product.12
More recently, the emergent theory of competitive harm has been some
version of “foreclosure,” or the idea that a restrictive vertical agreement can
exclude competitors or at least severely limit their opportunities. Under this
model, vertical practices are often considered to involve distinct upstream
7

See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 1800 (4th ed. 2018).
See id.
9 See id. ¶ 768(a)(6) (4th ed. 2015) (discussing monopolistic MFN clauses); id. ¶ 1807(b)(1)
(discussing MFN clauses as a form of quasi-exclusive dealing).
10 Section 3 of the Clayton Act, which applies to exclusive dealing and tying, expressly includes
discounts and rebates. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (applying to “discount from, or rebate upon” the prohibited
condition).
11 For vertical mergers and ownership, see United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S.
131 (1948) (considering vertical integration between movie production companies and movie
theaters, ultimately resulting in consent decree); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218,
226 (1947) (condemning acquisitions by Checker, a taxicab manufacturer, and taxicab operating
companies); United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 181–83 (1911) (divesting vertical
ownership between producers of tobacco and wrapping foil for tobacco products); United States v.
Corn Prods. Refin. Co., 234 F. 964, 985 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (condemning corn sugar makers’ control
of the candy market). On contractual vertical restraints, see Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404 (1911) (“The right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a
right of general property in movables, and restraints upon alienation have been generally regarded
as obnoxious to public policy, which is best subserved by great freedom of traffic in such things as
pass from hand to hand.”). And more recently, see United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388
U.S. 365, 378 (1967) (“[T]he decree should be revised to enjoin any limitation upon the freedom
of distributors to dispose of the Schwinn products, which they have bought from Schwinn, where
and to whomever they choose.”).
12 E.g., Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) (discussing tying
as patent misuse by facilitating leveraging from patented machine to unpatented tied product); Int’l
Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (discussing similarly the tying of patented machines
to unpatented salt); United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 105, 107 (1948) (condemning a film
distributor’s use of buying power in some markets to “increase[] their leverage over their
competitive situations”).
8
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and downstream markets.13 Foreclosure typically occurs when the restraint
covers a large enough percentage of one of these markets to make the entry
or survival of independent competitors less likely.
Foreclosure analysis focuses on two questions about potential harms to
competition: First, does the defendant have sufficient power in one of the
markets to create and enforce this restraint?14 And second, does the
challenged practice tend to cut off, or foreclose, a sufficient amount of
competition in the vertically related market?15
A much more benign theory of vertical control, developed by Chicago
School writers such as Robert Bork and Richard Posner, severely
downplayed foreclosure concerns. For them, vertical agreements were
almost always competitively harmless and should be legal.16 Their thinking
was heavily influenced by Ronald Coase’s idea that a vertical contract is
nothing more than a substitute for an internal production decision.17 For
example, the automobile maker could either manufacture its own engine
blocks or buy them from someone else. While that decision had no
consequences for competition, self-production might lead to lower
transaction costs. Further, when firms do things internally, they usually do
so exclusively. If Ford decides to build its own engine blocks rather than
purchase them, it typically will not go into the business of selling them to
rivals. So why should an exclusive contract be treated any differently?
Harm to competition from a vertical merger or exclusive contractual
restraint is not automatic. At one extreme, it might do no more than realign
buyers and sellers after subtracting out those firms that are removed by an
exclusive arrangement. But at the other extreme, a vertical merger or
exclusive contract could completely cut off producers of the vertically
related product. For example, if the only hospital in a town used a merger or

13 See, e.g., Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 449 (2009)
(discussing vertical price squeeze in an “upstream market” for wholesale production of digital
services and a “downstream market” for retail sales); Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Mont. Power Co.,
328 F.3d 1145, 1160 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing tying as involving an upstream market for the tying
product and a downstream market for the tied product); Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines,
Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 545 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing vertical refusal to deal and an upstream market
for airline flight reservation systems controlled by airlines in the downstream market).
14 E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7 (1984) (finding a thirty percent
market share insufficient).
15 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 330–31 (1961) (finding a foreclosure
too small when considering the entire geographic market for coal). On Tampa Electric, see infra
text accompanying notes 21–26.
16 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 225–45,
280–98 (1978); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
17 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (noting that “within
a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure
with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur co-ordinator”).

HOVENKAMP-LIVE (DO NOT DELETE)

September 2021]

9/18/21 11:53 AM

VERTICAL CONTROL

219

exclusive contract to procure anesthesiology services through a single firm,
the effect could be to dry up that town’s remaining market for anesthesiology
services: As a general matter, one cannot practice anesthesiology without a
hospital, and no alternatives remain. By contrast, if the same hospital should
enter an exclusive agreement with a plowing company for snow removal, the
arrangement would simply remove one customer from the snow removal
market. Here, the hospital makes up only a small part of the market for snow
removal, and the remaining plowing firms would go right on competing for
everyone else.
This Article introduces unified concepts as applicable to vertical control
scenarios. Section I discusses the foreclosure problem and vertically related
firms. Section II then relates foreclosure to market definition, and Section III
introduces the principle of “recapture.” Section IV synthesizes these
concepts, while Section V considers how courts might scrutinize markets
subject to technological differentiation.
I
AGGREGATED VS. ECONOMIC ASSESSMENTS OF VERTICAL EFFECTS

Antitrust analysis has historically estimated market power by reference
to market share of a defined “relevant market,” from which it draws
inferences about a firm or cartel’s ability to charge a monopoly price.18 In
vertical cases, courts also assess foreclosure at the upstream or downstream
level by considering the range of buyer or seller alternatives to the
contracting firms.
This foreclosure question differs from the market power question,
however. Its focus is not on the power to set high prices, but rather on the
strength and number of alternatives to the allegedly foreclosed firm. While
courts considering vertical practices sometimes speak of upstream and
downstream “markets,” they are not necessarily talking about “relevant
markets” in the market power sense. The U.S. Government’s 2020 Vertical
Merger Guidelines acknowledge this difference by changing the
terminology: They speak of a primary market but a “related product” to refer
to the vertically related firm or firms.19 The fear is of higher prices in the
primary market, which is facilitated by some form of foreclosure or other
injury that occurs in the related product.
As a general matter, the threat in the level containing the related product

18 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 500 (5th ed. 2021) (addressing market power
and market definition to determine a relevant market).
19 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES 3–4 (2020)
[hereinafter VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (“A related product is a product or service that is
supplied or controlled by the merged firm and is positioned vertically or is complementary to the
products and services in the relevant market.”).
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is not higher prices. Often it is just the opposite. For example, when a
dominant firm merges with or enters an exclusive contract with a
downstream firm, the resulting foreclosure may enable the dominant firm to
increase its prices in the upstream market. But the remaining rivals in the
downstream market will often end up earning less or in some cases be
excluded from the market altogether. For this reason, foreclosed rivals who
produce the vertically related product are often the plaintiffs in private
antitrust challenges to vertical restraints or mergers.20
The Supreme Court confronted the question of available alternative
trading opportunities, or foreclosure, in Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal
Co.21 An electric utility located in northern Florida built a new generation
facility that burned coal. It entered into a traditional common law
requirements contract to purchase all of its coal needs for 20 years from
Nashville Coal at an agreed upon price. The market price of coal later
increased, making the price in the requirements contract unfavorable to the
coal company. In order to get out of it, the coal company filed a declaratory
judgment action claiming that the agreement, which bound the coal company
to provide the utility with all of its coal needs, foreclosed competing coal
producers.22 As a result, the coal company argued, the contract violated the
Clayton Act’s prohibition on exclusive dealing contracts that
anticompetitively preclude a selling firm from dealing with competitors.23
Today, an antitrust lawsuit under that theory would be dismissed under the
“antitrust injury” doctrine: Whatever its status under the state law of
requirements contracts, as far as competition policy was concerned,
Nashville Coal was the beneficiary rather than the victim of the exclusive
coal agreement.24 It was the other coal producers who allegedly suffered
competitive injury.
The Supreme Court ruled against the coal company, but not on that
ground. Rather, it looked at the geographic range over which Nashville and
other coal companies sold coal. While the coal covered by the contract was
a significant percentage of coal sales in Tampa Electric’s immediate
purchasing area (Florida and Georgia), Nashville Coal and its predecessors
20 E.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (discussing tying in the
context of a challenge to a hospital’s exclusive contract with an anesthesiologist, brought by a
competing anesthesiologist); ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing exclusive dealing in the context of foreclosed competitors’ challenge to an exclusive
agreement in the market for heavy-duty transmissions); see also Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo BowlO-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977) (involving a vertical merger challenge by a competitor of acquired
downstream firms).
21 365 U.S. 320, 329 (1961).
22 Id. at 321. The Supreme Court had recently decided that a contract that is unlawful under the
antitrust laws cannot be enforced. See Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516, 521 (1959).
23 15 U.S.C. § 14.
24 On “antitrust injury,” see AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 335, 337 (5th ed. 2021).
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were located in Kentucky and Tennessee.25 If one looked over the entire area
between the buyer and seller, there were many coal producers and many coal
purchasers. Of these, the challenged utility contract covered less than one
percent of sales.26
Since Tampa Electric, the courts have tended to measure foreclosure by
looking at the entire range of potential trading partners who might be
plausible alternatives to the entity for which foreclosure is claimed.27 They
have settled on foreclosure percentages in the range of thirty to forty percent
as the minimum needed for illegality.28 But this narrow focus misses a variety
of possible competitive harms from vertical exclusion. In some cases, the
exclusive agreement may not exclude a firm altogether but may raise its costs
in a way that facilitates monopoly pricing.29 In other cases, it may make a
price increase profitable by changing bargaining relationships.30
Proper analysis of vertical control arrangements has unfortunately been
hindered by the Supreme Court’s conclusion in the AmEx case that if a
vertical practice is involved, market power can be established only by
reference to a relevant market.31 Although there are some workarounds, this
doctrine can make the competitive effects question much more difficult to
answer, particularly in markets for differentiated producers or products.32
25

Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 168 F. Supp. 456, 457 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).
Tampa Elec. Co., 365 U.S. at 333 (finding a maximum foreclosure of 0.77%).
27 E.g., Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 479 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
that a pathologist’s objection to a hospital’s exclusive dealing arrangement with another pathologist
should be tested in a national market in which hospitals recruit pathologists, not the market into
which the hospital sold its own services); Balaklaw v. Lovell, 14 F.3d 793, 799 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that the relevant market is the area in which anesthesiologists competed for jobs; here, a
hospital solicited contracts from anesthesiologists in several states); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs.,
823 F.2d 1215, 1233–35 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that in a contract for provision of car washing
equipment to service stations, the relevant market for determining foreclosure was the entire
national market for car wash equipment of various types).
28 See Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 373 F.3d 57, 68 (1st
Cir. 2004) (“For exclusive dealing, foreclosure levels are unlikely to be of concern where they are
less than 30 or 40 percent.”); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 52 (D.D.C.),
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 253 F.3d 34, 70 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that a roughly forty to fifty
percent foreclosure is necessary under section 1 of the Clayton Act); see also AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 1821 (4th ed. 2019) (summarizing case law on the minimum requisite
shares for unlawful exclusive dealing).
29 See infra text accompanying notes 39–41.
30 See infra text accompanying notes 49–53.
31 Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2285 n.7 (2018). On methodologies for assessing
market power, including market definition and alternatives, see infra text accompanying notes 32–
49. In AmEx, the government had sought to prove market power both indirectly, by reference to a
relevant market, and directly by reference to price-volume relationships. The district court had
found a relevant market for general purpose credit and charge card purchases, in which AmEx had
26.4%, as against Visa’s 45% and MasterCard’s 23.3%. It also found direct evidence. See United
States v. Am. Express Co., 88 F. Supp. 3d 143, 188–89 (E.D.N.Y. 2015).
32 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Looming Crisis in Antitrust Economics, 101 B.U. L. REV. 489,
528 (2021) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s vertical control analysis in the AmEx decision).
26
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Notwithstanding AmEx, antitrust analysis is increasingly moving away
from methodologies for assessing power that require a market definition and
toward alternatives that look directly at output responses to price changes or
at the effect of certain practices on bargaining relationships.33 One significant
limitation of market definition approaches to assessing power is their
inability to deal with any degree of differentiation in either products or
geography. Once we have defined a relevant market, all of the firms inside
that market are treated as if they are perfect competitors, which means that
they are regarded as having infinitely high substitutability from one to
another. By contrast, if a market is defined so as to exclude a particular firm,
that firm is treated as if it does not compete at all. This approach cannot begin
to pick up the complex array of situations in which firms bargain with one
another. Recent developments in antitrust law have started to consider
alternative ways of measuring market shares and foreclosure effects,
including direct measuring and recapture.
II
METERING FORECLOSURE: DIRECT MEASUREMENT AND MARKET SHARES

Foreclosure occurs when a vertical merger or exclusive contract
provision denies market opportunities to rivals. For example, if a city has ten
appliance retailers and an appliance manufacturer either purchases or enters
an exclusive dealing agreement with one of them, there are still nine
remaining retailers through which competing appliance manufacturers can
sell. If the manufacturer should make such deals with all ten, however, then
competing manufacturers could not retail in that town, except perhaps by
building their own retail stores. Several factors are relevant to determining
foreclosure, including the number of sellers of the related product, their
relative sizes, the number that have been made inaccessible by a vertical
restriction, and the difficulty of establishing new ones.
The measurement of foreclosure in vertical exclusion cases has been
predominantly binary. Consistent with the theory of relevant markets, the
traditional approach to foreclosure would treat the ten retail stores in the
example above as identical in product offerings, although not in size, which
is essential for computing overall foreclosure as a percentage of the market.
This approach subjected foreclosure theory to a criticism popularized by the
Chicago School that the profit maximizing price of a good does not change
simply because one firm also comes to own the retailers.34 That would do no
33 See id. at 512–14 (illustrating alternative methodologies and discussing flaws with only using
market definition).
34 See Robert H. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an
Economic Misconception, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 157 (1954) (criticizing the “leverage” theory of tying
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more than force manufacturer substitution from one store to another. But that
classical foreclosure theory ignores many lessons from marginalist
economics, one of which is that in equilibrium, only the marginal retailer
earns competitive returns.35 Other retailers who have lower costs will earn
more. Others may have had even higher costs, but if the market is
competitive they will have exited.36
This rather conventional observation about marginal market
participants drives the rationale for theories of RRC, or raising rivals’ costs.
As a result, it is difficult to see why some people objected to it.37 The 2020
Vertical Merger Guidelines acknowledge the theory and supply some
illustrations.38
Traditionally, the foreclosure resulting from a vertical merger (or other
arrangement) was measured against the full range of firms selling in the
market where foreclosure was feared. That was the procedure that the
Supreme Court followed in the Tampa Electric case.39 It counted up all the
coal sellers in the geographic range covered by the transaction, added up
their output, and concluded that the challenged contract covered less than
one percent of this amount. Significantly, the market was coal, a commodity,
and the Court did not trouble itself with questions about product
differentiation, differences in quality, or differential production costs.
Once we consider the role of marginal and inframarginal firms, the
“market definition” question changes, or at least acquires a change in focus.
It is no longer particularly important to know the full range of vertically
related sellers, nor the market shares of those that are tied up by the exclusive
arrangement. For example, suppose the related product is differentiated from
one firm to the next or that the producers have different costs or are more or
less desirable for some other reason. In that case, it is less important to know
all of the firms in the market than it is to know whose behavior is constrained
by the challenged arrangement and who are that firm’s closest rivals.
and exclusive dealing); Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Bork and Vertical Integration: Leverage,
Foreclosure, and Efficiency, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 983, 995–97 (2014) (discussing Bork and the
Chicago School’s criticism of foreclosure and leverage theory).
35 In most cases involving a fungible product, the marginal seller is the one with the highest
costs.
36 Thus, some economists distinguish raising rivals’ costs from “total foreclosure” while
discussing the two concepts together. See Carl Shapiro, Vertical Mergers and Input Foreclosure:
Lessons from the AT&T/Time Warner Case, REV. INDUS. ORG. (forthcoming 2021),
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/verticalmergers.pdf.
37 E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 196 (2d ed. 2001) (describing RRC as “not a
happy formula”).
38 VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at 4.
39 See supra text accompanying notes 21–26; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Competitive Harm
from Vertical Mergers (Inst. for L. & Econ., Research Paper No. 20-51, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3683386 (discussing circumstances under
which vertical mergers can be anticompetitive).
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Suppose, for example, that the ten retailers in the allegedly foreclosed
market have markup costs ranging from twenty to thirty percent. In
competitive equilibrium, the higher cost firms will just barely stay in
business while the lower cost ones will earn a profit. In that case, a vertical
merger or exclusive contract with the lowest cost firm could relegate rival
manufacturers to dealing with the higher cost firms. With the lower cost firm
taken out of the mix, the equilibrium price charged by the remaining sellers
could be higher.40
In order to perform this analysis, we would not have to define the
market for the retailers. We would merely need to identify those that were
the most desirable from the upstream parties’ point of view. Both the Vertical
Merger Guidelines and some of the case law permit this approach.41 The
better placed trading partners could be those that are geographically closest
if transportation costs are important. They could also be those that produce
more desirable products or that employ superior and more cost-effective
technologies.
In Qualcomm, for example, the district court observed that Qualcomm,
a dominant producer of modem chips for cellular phones, procured an
exclusive agreement to supply chips to Apple, thus excluding Intel as a
supplier. Apple was the most desirable customer, and Qualcomm did not
wish for Apple to be purchasing from two different suppliers.42 Apple, by
contrast, wanted the two modem chip suppliers to be competing with one
another so that it could obtain more favorable terms.43 That would have been
the more competitive outcome. Qualcomm responded by refusing to supply

40 This is particularly true in the relatively common situation where the supplier’s cost curves
are upward sloping. Thanks to Steven Salop for this observation. See also Jonathan B. Baker, Nancy
L. Rose, Steven C. Salop & Fiona Scott Morton, Recommendations and Comments on the Draft
Vertical
Merger
Guidelines
6,
12
(Feb.
23,
2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/798-draft-vertical-mergerguidelines/vmg21_baker_rose_salop_scott_morton_comments.pdf (suggesting that the elimination
of the lowest cost trading partner could raise equilibrium price).
41 See, e.g., VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at 6–7 (discussing a vertical
merger obtaining the best sources of oranges and relegating others to more costly oranges); see also
Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 505 F.3d 302, 312 n.19 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that a consumer or
competitor outside of the relevant market is not necessarily precluded from having an antitrust
injury); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that
Dentsply’s exclusive dealing imposed on key dealers and relegated rival dental laboratories to more
costly and less effective distribution channels); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 70
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that Microsoft’s actions foreclosed Netscape’s access to the most efficient
distribution channels). For a contrasting approach, see Omega Env’t, Inc. v. Gilbarco, Inc., 127
F.3d 1157, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 1997) (treating all distribution channels alike and dismissing the
plaintiff’s complaint).
42 See FTC v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 736 (N.D. Cal. 2019), rev’d, 969 F.3d 974
(9th Cir. 2020).
43 Qualcomm, 411 F. Supp. 3d at 736.

HOVENKAMP-LIVE (DO NOT DELETE)

September 2021]

9/18/21 11:53 AM

VERTICAL CONTROL

225

chips to Apple’s newest devices unless it obtained an exclusive deal.44 The
district court found this conduct unlawful, but the Ninth Circuit reversed,
concluding that the only serious competition for Apple’s business was with
Intel. It even conceded that the result of its exclusive arrangement with Apple
was very likely higher prices. It faulted the district court for identifying the
relevant harm as accruing to Qualcomm’s customers, “resulting in higher
prices to consumers,” rather than to Qualcomm’s competitors.45 The Ninth
Circuit apparently believed that injury to customers fell outside of the
relevant market and that only injury to competitors counted.46
What the Ninth Circuit should have seen is that this dispute involved
two well-placed suppliers (Qualcomm and Intel) with a single large and
highly desired customer (Apple) who was naturally attempting to force
competition between them. Instead, Qualcomm took advantage of its
dominant position to insist on exclusive dealing. Affirming liability should
have been straightforward, particularly given the fact that prices were
conceded to be higher as a result.
The court had seen this already in the 1916 American Can case, where
the defendant, who was a dominant maker of metal food cans, bought up or
acquired exclusive deals covering all of the superior can-making machinery.
This relegated rivals to inferior technologies:
[F]or a year or two after defendant’s formation it was practically
impossible for any competitor to obtain the most modern, up-to-date,
automatic machinery, and [ ] the difficulties in the way of getting such
machinery were not altogether removed until the expiration of the six
years for which the defendant had bound up the leading manufacturers of
[can-making] machinery.47

When considering foreclosure from a vertical practice, a fact finder
must focus less on the overall range of alternatives and more on the relative
placement and quality of the acquired or contracting firm vis-à-vis the most
closely competing alternatives. It is not necessary to define the market for
these firms overall, but the fact finder must identify the closest rivals. To the
extent the defendant’s vertical practice ties up the lowest cost or best of the
related producers, rivals will be relegated to those that are inferior. As a
theory of harm, raising rivals’ costs is more likely and occurs more
frequently than complete market exclusion, although the latter is possible
too. The fact finder would usually require expert testimony to determine the
equilibrium price effects on the defendant and the vertically related firm, and
also of rivals attempting to compete with it.

44
45
46
47

Id. at 737–38.
Qualcomm, 969 F.3d at 992–93.
Id. at 992–93, 1002.
United States v. Am. Can Co., 230 F. 859, 875 (D. Md. 1916).
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One important consequence of this approach is that the market share
numbers that the antitrust case law traditionally attaches to foreclosure
percentages are not particularly meaningful in most cases. The tying and
exclusive dealing case law generally aggregates the market subject to
foreclosure concerns and considers foreclosure as a percentage of the whole,
as the Supreme Court did in Tampa Electric. In general, it proclaims
minimum market foreclosure percentages in the range of thirty percent to
forty percent as a condition for illegality.48 When we focus more accurately
on marginal effects and the possibility of raising rivals’ costs, however, these
numbers are much less significant. For example, if the lowest cost firm in a
market is subject to an exclusivity agreement, anticompetitive results,
particularly RRC, could occur even if the percentage of total sales was far
less than thirty percent. By contrast, if only the least efficient firm or firms
in a market were made subject to such an agreement, even aggregate
foreclosure percentages higher than forty percent might result in no
competitive harm.
III
MARKET DEFINITION AND DIRECT MEASUREMENT: “RECAPTURE”

Whenever a firm raises its price, it will, ceteris paribus, lose some sales.
Whether the price increase is profitable depends on the size of the price
increase, the firm’s margins, and the number of sales that it loses. If the firm
can recapture some of these lost sales, then a price increase of any given
magnitude will be more likely to be profitable.49
The idea of “recapture” has become an essential component of modern
economic analysis of market definition, as well as more direct measures of
market power. The theory depends on observed differences in cost, quality,
margins, or other attributes among alternative firms. That is, it assumes that
the firms are not perfect competitors. Beyond that, it is relatively
straightforward: Firm A will lose a certain number of sales if it increases its
own product price. Considering A alone, that price increase could be
48 Cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 7–8, 18, 31 (1984) (reversing the
Fifth Circuit’s finding of a tying arrangement by East Jefferson Hospital, which served thirty
percent of the relevant geographic market, between use of the hospital’s operating rooms and the
hospital’s chosen and exclusive anesthesia service, and holding that there had been “no showing
that the market as a whole [had] been affected at all by the [exclusive anesthesia service] contract”);
Sewell Plastics, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 720 F. Supp. 1196, 1212–14 (W.D.N.C. 1989), aff’d, 912
F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that even with forty percent of the market in the southeastern
United States, Southeastern Container, Inc. did not have the market power to charge a price above
the competitive level, which meant that its exclusive dealing with The Coca-Cola Company did not
have an anticompetitive effect on the market). See also HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, §§ 6.2, 6.5b,
10.3 (identifying minimum foreclosure percentages required by courts for various vertical
offenses).
49 HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, § 9.5.

HOVENKAMP-LIVE (DO NOT DELETE)

September 2021]

9/18/21 11:53 AM

VERTICAL CONTROL

227

unprofitable. But suppose that a high percentage of those lost sales go to firm
B, which produces a reasonably close substitute. If these B sales were added
back in (recaptured), the price increase could be profitable. For purposes of
market definition, we would express that conclusion by saying that A and B
are essential components of a “hypothetical monopolist,”50 which means that
A standing alone is not a monopolist, but A plus B together might be.51 As a
result, A and B are in the same relevant market.52 If the two were owned by
the same firm or organized into a cartel, their joint price increase might be
profitable even though A’s price increase acting alone was not. Depending
on the substitution differences between A and B together and other firms in
the market, as well as the two firms’ margins, this could also warrant
challenging a merger of A and B under the theory of “unilateral effects.”53 If
A and B together are still not enough to sustain the required price increase,
we repeat the exercise, perhaps by including firm C as part of the merger and
contemplating whether the substitution differences between firms A, B, and
C together and other firms in the market could warrant an anticompetitive
50 Some courts and writers speak of a “hypothetical cartel,” which confers the same meaning.
E.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding ASA, 341 F. Supp. 3d 27, 47 (D.D.C.
2018); see also David Glasner & Sean P. Sullivan, The Logic of Market Definition, 83 ANTITRUST
L.J. 293, 314 (2020).
51 On this reasoning in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, see Carl Shapiro, The 2010
Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 90–91 (2010)
(stating the key inquiry for the hypothetical monopolist analysis is “what percentage of the unit
sales lost, when that product’s price rises, are recaptured by other products controlled by the
hypothetical monopolist”). See also Daniel P. O’Brien & Steven C. Salop, Competitive Effects of
Partial Ownership: Financial Interest and Corporate Control, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 559, 573 (2000)
(reasoning that a hypothetical firm facing a net loss in profits due to a price increase driving away
customers may have different incentives if it can merge with a competitor in order to recapture
some of the profits that would otherwise be lost from the price increase). For evaluating mergers,
the theory goes back at least forty years. See Gregory J. Werden, The 1982 Merger Guidelines and
the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 253, 254 (2003) (stating
that “the hypothetical monopolist paradigm predates the 1982 Merger Guidelines by more than two
decades” but did not find much appreciation by antitrust scholarship until the late 1970s).
52 For explanation of the antitrust Agencies’ approach, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE
COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 11–12 (2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES]. See also Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Recapture, Pass-Through, and Market
Definition, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 586, 588 (2010) (identifying how the government defines the
relevant market using the hypothetical monopolist test, according to the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, and presenting a new method for applying the test).
53 See United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 81 (D.D.C. 2011) (“A merger is
likely to have unilateral anticompetitive effect if the acquiring firm will have the incentive to raise
prices or reduce quality after the acquisition, independent of competitive responses from other
firms.”); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶¶ 913–15 (4th ed. 2017) (discussing
power assessment and market definition in unilateral effects cases, unilateral effects in productdifferentiated markets, and how capacity constraints or differential costs can facilitate unilateral
effects); Shapiro, supra note 51, at 60–85 (analyzing the “distinct modes of analysis that the
Agencies use to investigate unilateral effects in different market settings”); O’Brien & Salop, supra
note 51, at 573–84 (analyzing how incentives regarding unilateral pricing change based on the
structure of corporate control between the acquiring and acquired firms).
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challenge—and so on.
A vertical merger can work the same way: It can facilitate a price
increase when it enables revenues that might otherwise be lost from such a
price increase to be recaptured through the increased sales by the acquired
firm.54 Indeed, one of the approaches taken in the Vertical Merger Guidelines
is a variant of the hypothetical monopolist test used for market definition.55
For example, suppose an automobile manufacturer acquires a firm that
produces automobile bodies and sells them to several automobile
producers.56 After the acquisition, the automobile body firm, now owned by
the automobile manufacturer, raises the price of bodies. As a result, some
competing automobile manufacturers switch away and purchase automobile
bodies from another supplier. Assume that prior to the acquisition, this price
increase would have been unprofitable to the body manufacturer alone—the
number of lost sales was too great in comparison with the price increase.
Subsequent to the merger, however, some customers respond to the autobody
price increase imposed on rival automobile manufacturers by switching to
the acquiring automobile manufacturer. In that case, some of the losses that
would have accrued to the body manufacturer as an independent entity are
recaptured in increased sales of automobiles. This recapture may be
sufficient to make the price increase profitable.
The government used this theory in its unsuccessful challenge to
AT&T’s acquisition of Time Warner (“TW”).57 AT&T distributes cable and
satellite TV services to its various subscribers. It owns DirecTV as well as
some smaller cable television companies. TW is a very large owner of digital
media, which it licenses to digital programming distributors such as AT&T.
Digital programming is non-rivalrous, which means that each digital copy
can be licensed out an indefinite number of times. It is also subject to
54 Cf. Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1962, 1973
(2018) (describing how an upstream merging firm can raise the input price it charges to the rivals
of its downstream merger partner—“upward pricing pressure”—which can push consumers to the
downstream merging firm instead of its rivals and allow it to raise its price); Serge Moresi & Steven
C. Salop, vGUPPI: Scoring Unilateral Price Incentives in Vertical Mergers, 79 ANTITRUST L.J.
185, 197–98 (2018) (counting “market recapture percentage” as a component of a mathematical
representation of incentives for an upstream firm to change the output price charged by its
downstream merger partner).
55 VERTICAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at 5 (referencing the hypothetical
monopolist test described in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines); see HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 52, at 11–12 (describing implementation of the test).
56 These facts are hypothetical but are adopted loosely from the General Motors/Fisher Body
merger, which occurred in 1926. For opposing views of the acquisition, compare R.H. Coase, The
Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors, 43 J.L. & ECON. 15 (2000), with Benjamin Klein,
Fisher-General Motors and the Nature of the Firm, 43 J.L. & ECON. 105 (2000). One difference
between the hypothetical and the real situation is that prior to their merger Fisher and GM
apparently dealt only with one another.
57 United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 3d 161 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 916 F.3d 1029 (D.C.
Cir. 2019).
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significant product differentiation, and there are large differences in
marginal value among content suppliers. TW owns titles such as the Harry
Potter movie series and Wonder Woman that are not only highly desirable
but also unavailable elsewhere. An independent TW would have no incentive
to deny programming to anyone willing to pay its price, which would be the
profit-maximizing rate for free-standing TW. In that case, TW’s profitmaximizing strategy would be to license to all takers, perhaps with some
price discrimination to the extent that its customers had differing demand
elasticities.58
After the merger, however, things change. AT&T, the new owner of
TW, also owns distribution assets. If AT&T/TW raises the license price for
some of its media or simply blocks licensing to some third-party carriers,
TW will still lose sales, but some of that lost revenue will be recaptured to
the extent that it induces customers to switch to an AT&T firm as a
distributor. TW is not like one out of ten appliance stores in an area that
might be reasonably good substitutes for one another. Rather, for many of its
titles there are no good alternatives. For example, current customers of Dish
Network might respond to higher fees or a blackout of desirable TW titles
by switching to DirecTV, which AT&T also owns.59 Whether that tradeoff
is profitable—and by how much—is an empirical question and depends on
the diversion rate at which subscribers will switch; but it also indicates that
AT&T/TW’s profit-maximizing price following the merger would be higher
than it had been prior to the merger. The “where . . . the effect . . . may be
substantially to lessen competition”60 language of section 7 of the Clayton
Act is triggered by a probable price increase caused by the merger.61
This theory also works for some contractual relationships, although to
the best of my knowledge, no court has applied it. One of Ronald Coase’s
contributions to law and economics was the insight that anything that can be
accomplished within a firm can be specified with a properly designed

58 The cost of licensing is virtually zero, and supply is unlimited. As a result, the optimal
strategy would be to license to every potential customer at a price equal to the inverse of its
elasticity of demand. See, e.g., W. Michael Hanemann, Willingness to Pay and Willingness to
Accept: How Much Can They Differ?, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 635, 638–39 (1991) (noting that
willingness to pay varies inversely with elasticity of demand).
59 See Final, Corrected Brief of Appellant at 16, 47–48, United States v. AT&T, Inc., 310 F.
Supp. 3d 161 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 18-5214), 2018 WL 5099066, at *16, *47–48 (noting that after
the merger, AT&T could use blackouts to switch subscribers to DirecTV or other AT&T outlets);
id. at 68 (speaking of these switchers as the “diversion rate”).
60 15 U.S.C. § 14.
61 See Moresi & Salop, supra note 54, at 197 (explaining how vertical merger may lead to price
increases by the post-merger firm); see also Shapiro, supra note 36, at 4 (illustrating the relationship
between RRC and diversion). For good analysis of other recent vertical mergers decisions, see
Steven C. Salop, Analyzing Vertical Mergers to Avoid False Negatives: Three Recent Case Studies,
ANTITRUST, Summer 2019, at 27.
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contract.62 A vertical control agreement can harm competition when it
enables a firm to recapture revenues from a price increase that it would
otherwise have lost. In order to work, a contractual arrangement would have
to force a price increase (or quality decrease) that would ordinarily be
unprofitable but that the firm would be able to recapture as a result of its
contractual relationship with another firm.
One contractual tool for this purpose is the most-favored-nation
(“MFN”) clause, which is a contractual provision that specifies the minimum
price that a contracting partner must charge to third parties in competition
with the principal firm.63 For example, the automobile manufacturer in the
previous illustration might enter a long-term contract with the body
manufacturer that also requires the latter to charge higher prices to the
automobile manufacturer’s competitors. This could induce customers to
switch to the automobile manufacturer’s automobiles, thus recapturing lost
profits elsewhere. The body manufacturer would have to be compensated for
its lost profits from the high prices charged to the rivals, but to the extent the
strategy is profitable to the auto manufacturer, it will be able to share its
profits, and the two will reach a joint maximizing solution.64
A class of eBook sellers has filed such a complaint against Amazon,
alleging that its MFN agreements with publishers force prices to be higher
at Amazon’s eBook selling competitors. The complaint alleges that:
Because of Amazon’s market power in the Relevant Market, these
contractual requirements prevent Amazon’s actual and potential rivals
from offering lower prices or promotions, introducing different business
models, or developing innovative products. One competitor told the
Committee that the effect of Amazon’s MFN and related provisions is that
publishers “raise the price on competitor sites to match Amazon’s
price.” In other words, Amazon uses the MFN and related provisions to
raise prices not only on its own platform, but also on platforms that it does
not control.65

62 See generally Coase, supra note 17, at 390–91 (noting that firms allow the consolidation of
a series of contracts into one); Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of the Firm, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1983) (expanding on Coase’s work).
63 See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 2–3, Silverman v. Amazon, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11,
2021) (No. 1:21-cv-01256), 2021 WL 528598 (alleging that Amazon’s use of MFN clauses in
eBook sales to prevent book publishers from offering lower prices on alternative eBook platforms
is anticompetitive and illegal); see also id. at 3 (noting that the result of the MFN clauses is that the
plaintiff class—eBook purchasers—must pay more for eBooks on alternative platforms than they
would absent the MFN clauses’ influence on pricing).
64 Cf. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960) (pointing to the
fact that “[t]he economic problem in all cases of harmful effects is how to maximise the value of
production,” which does not necessarily account for social costs, like higher prices to consumers)
(emphasis added).
65 Class Action Complaint, supra note 63, at 30. The complaint also alleges that Amazon
controls about eighty percent of eBook sales in the United States. Id. at 2.
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This would serve to protect Amazon’s own higher margins and, if
necessary, enable Amazon to compensate the publishers for losses of
revenue on other sites. While this outcome could be accomplished by means
of a vertical merger between Amazon and eBook publishers, it could also be
accomplished through a sufficiently specified contract.
IV
POWER AND EFFECTS

The metered foreclosure and recapture strategies outlined here depend
on rates of substitution or responses to price changes that traditional market
definition approaches fail to capture. That is not surprising. The tools of
market definition were developed before empirical methodologies for
measuring marginal substitution rates, or elasticities, came into vogue.66
Because of its binary approach, traditional tools that estimate market
power by reference to a relevant market work very poorly for this purpose.
They can count something as inside the market or outside but cannot meter
gradations. For example, if several potential vertically related trading
partners have different costs or other measures of desirability, any approach
that depended on placing them in a relevant market for measurement of
foreclosure would put them either inside or outside, but it could not meter
anything in between. Of course, a court might conduct a separate fact finding
to the effect that the acquired or obligated firms were better placed than
rivals, but this alone would not enable it to quantify the results.
The better approach is to start out with the pair of firms subject to a
merger or whose conduct is governed by an exclusionary contract provision.
The question of whether this pairing will result in a price increase depends
on how the arrangement limits the opportunities of alternative firms, whether
upstream or downstream. This is a function of the extent to which a merger
or contracting partner has cost or placement advantages over the next best
placed firms. If we can produce these numbers for a small number of best
placed firms, the definition of a broader relevant market adds nothing. Nor
does information about the share of the overall market that is covered by the
restraint. If we cannot produce these figures with any degree of reliability,
then defining markets and measuring shares is a poorer alternative, although
at that point we may have no choice. That is, market definition approaches
should be the fallback when more direct measures are unavailable.
V

66 For pioneering work in this area, see RICHARD S. MARKOVITS, ECONOMICS AND THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF U.S. AND E.U. ANTITRUST LAW (2014). See also Louis
Kaplow, On the Relevance of Market Power, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (2017).
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MARKET BOUNDARIES FOR TECHNOLOGICALLY DIVERSE PRODUCTS

Vertical practices are not the only ones that jump traditional market
boundaries, although the facts are often buried in questions about market
definition, which incidentally also distorts the analysis. Markets subject to a
high degree of technological differentiation pose analogous problems. These
are products that are differentiated by far more than by simple branding or
design details.
Consider the Continental Can decision, which condemned the merger
of a manufacturer of metal food cans with a maker of glass jars.67 Although
cans and glass jars compete for some uses, they are highly differentiated
products that use both different inputs and different production technologies.
That makes market definition issues very hazardous. After finding that there
were some markets in which cans and bottles competed, including baby food,
soft drinks, and beer, the Court lumped cans and bottles into one market and
condemned the merger in an aggregated can/bottle market. In a different
legal context, and with a different outcome, the decision in the DuPont
(Cellophane) case declined to condemn DuPont of monopolization after
lumping cellophane, waxed paper, wrapping paper, and metal foil together
into a single market for “flexible packaging materials.”68
In both of these cases, simply lumping the diverse products into a single
market was mistaken. The issue in DuPont was more difficult than the one
in Continental Can, but both courts would have done better to apply a version
of the recapture analysis described previously. The question in Continental
Can was whether there was some grouping of sales for which the merger
would have led to a price increase. For example, standalone Continental’s
ability to raise its price to beer producers69 may have been limited by the
competition from Hazel-Atlas’s glass bottles. Continental would lose too
many sales. To the extent those purchasers defected to Hazel-Atlas, however,
the merger would enable Continental to recapture them, perhaps making its
price increase profitable. This process may have to be repeated for other uses
for which cans and bottles were viable alternatives. Success might also
depend on Continental’s ability to price discriminate against the grouping of
sales under scrutiny. The language of section 7 of the Clayton Act, which
condemns a merger with anticompetitive effects “in any line of commerce,”70
67

United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 397–400, 404 (1956)
(dismissing the complaint after concluding that DuPont lacked power in a broad market for flexible
packaging materials); see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, ¶ 539 (using the DuPont
case to “question decisions relying on apparent high cross-elasticity of demand at prevailing prices
to adopt a broad market”).
69 For this analysis, we assume that Continental had the power to price discriminate between
different types of can customers.
70 15 U.S.C. § 18.
68
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would reach a merger that led to a price increase in just a subset of the
markets in question.
The issue in DuPont is more difficult to address for two reasons. First,
in a monopolization case, the substitution query may have to be applied to a
larger number of firms than a single merger partner. Whether cellophane
enjoyed substantial market power depended on its substitutability with
multiple candidates. These included wax paper, glassine, greaseproof paper,
brown wrapping paper, tin foil, and so on, starting with the closest rival for
any particular use.71 Each alternative that met the hypothetical monopolist
requirement should have been included in the market until the alternatives
were exhausted or the defendant’s share was too small to sustain a
monopolization charge.72 Once again, a price increase would very likely
depend on DuPont’s ability to price discriminate against those purchasers
who lacked good alternatives.
Second, the Court would have to be satisfied that substitution was not
observed because DuPont was already selling cellophane at a significant
markup above its costs—the well-known “Cellophane fallacy” problem.73
Answering that question will involve econometrics rather than market
definition. Measurement tools are available for determining the extent to
which a firm’s prices exceed its costs.74 Addressing the markup directly may
dispense with the need to define a relevant market. That is, a high price/cost
margin is itself evidence of significant market power. That may be all that is
needed in situations where the legal standard does not insist on a market
definition as a mechanism for establishing power.
CONCLUSION

Evaluating vertical control mechanisms requires an understanding of
how a challenged structure (whether in property or contract) changes the
constraints under which parties bargain. In a well-functioning market, two

71

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Cf. DuPont, 351 U.S. at 417 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (noting that while the prices of the
two major producers of cellophane, DuPont and Sylvania, moved in lockstep, the prices of other
flexible packaging materials seemed to be unaffected by changes in cellophane prices).
73 On this problem, see HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, § 3.4 (using a method that exaggerates the
relevant market of a product—i.e., considering the pricing of cellophane against the pricing of all
“flexible packaging materials”—which results in an overly large market definition and inaccurate
evaluation of competitive pricing).
74 Cf. Steven Berry, Martin Gaynor & Fiona Scott Morton, Do Increasing Markups Matter?
Lessons from Empirical Industrial Organization, 33 J. ECON. PERSPS. 44 (2019) (noting recent
improvements in the theory for measuring price/cost margins); see also Chad Syverson,
Macroeconomics and Market Power: Context, Implications, and Open Questions, 33 J. ECON.
PERSPS. 23 (2019) (comparing various approaches); Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism,
61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 730 (2018) (emphasizing the study of individual markets in order to
assess market power via levels of sales concentration).
72
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bargaining partners will maximize any value that is jointly available. While
that proposition is naturally associated with the Coase Theorem,75 it is in fact
far broader and covers all situations in which contracting parties are able to
reach an agreement.76
An important corollary, however, is that agreements may be jointly
maximizing precisely because they create a monopoly. Cartels are the most
obvious example of this.77 Legal rules sometimes constrain firms’ ability to
make profit-maximizing deals because those deals, once made, injure
competition.78 In such cases, understanding how a restraint or acquisition
affects particular bargaining relationships can tell us much more than any
information concerning the overall relevant market in which the firms
operate. This approach requires increased sensitivity to the fact that even the
firms that are properly placed into the same defined market may be quite
different from one another. So even though a grand theory of vertical control
could simplify the legal query, courts should be attentive to the case-specific
details in firm and market structures that may lead to foreclosure and market
restraints.

75 E.g., Joseph Farrell, Information and the Coase Theorem, 1 ECON. PERSPS. 113, 123 (1987)
(providing an example where party B prefers to offer a less generous contract to party A than the
contract that maximizes joint surplus because the less generous contract gives more of the surplus
to B); Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 1, 4 (1982) (“The proposition that
resource allocation is efficient, regardless of the structure of liability law, provided that bargaining
is frictionless, is one version of the Coase Theorem.”).
76 See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber, Complementary Monopolies and Bargaining, 60 J.L. & ECON.
29 (2017) (exploring various scenarios of bargaining decisions under the Cournot model, where
input suppliers choose maximum quantities above those that maximize joint benefits).
77 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, § 4.1 (observing—within an analysis of cartel cheating—
that the profit-maximizing price of a perfectly functioning cartel is the same as the monopoly price).
78 In the context of patent law, see Erik Hovenkamp, Competition, Inalienability, and the
Economic Analysis of Patent Law, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 33 (2018).

